
Listen to the 10/14/26 argument to the U.S. Court of Appeals re U.S. President Trump's deployment of the National Guard to reduce crime in Washington, DC (DC v Donald Trump)
International Bankruptcy, Restructuring, True Crime and Appeals - Court Audio Recording Podcast ยท
00:00:00
00:00:00
Transcript
00:00:00
Case number 25 and 548. District Of Columbia, mister Donald j Crump in his official capacity as president of The United States et al. The balance. Mister McCarter for the balance. Mister Reich for the.
00:00:14
Morning, miss McArthur. You can proceed when you're ready.
00:00:17
Thank you, judge Pillard. And may it please the court? I would like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal, if I may. Last August, the president declared a crime emergency in the District Of Columbia, concluding that violence and disorder in the district were undermining the proper and safe functioning of the federal government. As part of a broader federal initiative to address that crisis, The president ordered the secretary of defense to mobilize the DC National Guard and to coordinate with state governors to bring in state guards in a title 32 status to support the federal mission.
00:00:53
By any measure, that mission has been a striking success with even the DC mayor acknowledging the dramatic decrease in violent crime since the deployments began. More to the point, however, the deployments are also lawful. As a unanimous panel of this court concluded in granting a state pending appeal, the president likely acted within his broad authority under both the DC militia code and 32 USC section five zero two f. And the district's contrary arguments rest on an untenably cramped view of the president's authority under those statutes, a view that is inconsistent not only with the statute's text and history, but with decades of practice and one that would leave the DC National Guard unable to perform most of the vital functions traditionally performed by state national guards. What's more, the district hasn't established any irreparable harm from these deployments, and the public interest strongly favors allowing them to continue.
00:01:54
This court should accordingly reverse reverse. Now we've invoked two separate bases of statutory authority that support these deployments. I'd like to start, if I may, with the DC militia code. And before diving into the specific provisions of the code that authorize the deployment here, I'd like to set the table, if I can, with sort of a framing point because I think the parties here have presented the court with really dramatically different visions of what the DC National Guard is and what it is allowed to do. But we do, I think, start from one common premise that we share, which is that when congress set up the DC National Guard in 1889 in the DC militia code, what it was aiming to do was to place the DC National Guard in its militia capacity on roughly the same footing as state national guard and to place the president as the commander in chief in essentially the same position that a state governor stands with respect to a state national guard.
00:02:57
So I think we share that premise, but we reach dramatically different conclusions. Our view
00:03:03
You said, to set up the DC National Guard on roughly
00:03:08
the same footing as state's national guards and the president in the analogous role
00:03:13
to the state governors.
00:03:14
That's correct. I think we we... I think that is common ground among the parties.
00:03:19
So as a as a structural matter in the late nineteenth century, would you agree that most, if not all of the state codes would distinguish between command authority and deployment authority? That is, they would designate the governor, the commander in chief, and then there would be separate provisions that explicitly identify the situations in which the governor could deploy the guard.
00:03:43
I I have certainly seen plenty of state militia codes that follow that structure, that have a designation of commander in chief, and then they have an enumeration of various circumstances in which the governor is authorized to deploy the guard. And that's, I think, the key inference that the district wants you to draw here
00:04:00
that
00:04:01
Yeah. So this is the follow-up. If we're just focused on forty nine four zero nine, it does seem that your argument is that there's sort of an implicit broad deployment authority just sort of inherent in designating the president, the commander in chief. And that does seem at a minimum intention with the point you just agreed with.
00:04:21
You you have correctly understood our argument, but I don't think the tension is there, judge Garcia. I would agree with you if you have a state militia code like some of those that the district has cited that has a designation that is then followed by an enumeration of various specific circumstances in which the governor can call out the guard. You might draw that inference and say the designation as commander in chief doesn't provide any additional authority over and above the specific enumeration. I think where that argument breaks down for the district is that the DC militia code contains no such enumeration of circumstances in which the president is authorized to deploy the guard. The only provision in the DC militia code that speaks to the president calling out the national guard is section one zero three.
00:05:04
That's the provision about suppressing riots at the request of one of the three officials listed in section one zero three.
00:05:11
I appreciate that argument. I just wonder at least one possibility for why that wouldn't be so strange is that at the time and now, the president can federalize the DC Guard and has authority under the Insurrection Act and other statutes. And so to sort of say, well, the president is left less powerful than a governor doesn't seem quite right. Right. You might have, a congress that thought the president can already call out, the DC Guard and every guard in response to a true emergency, and we're just sort of filling in the the the blanks as to some of these more minor situations.
00:05:48
It's not actually clear to me, judge Garcia, that in 1889 when the militia code was enacted that the president could use the federalization statute in effect at that time to activate the DC National Guard. Relevant federalization statute was still the militia act of 1795, which only spoke about federalizing state national guards. Wasn't until nineteen o three in the Dick Act that congress enacted the predecessor of what is today section one two four zero six and specifically included the DC National Guard. But even even setting aside that, historical uncertainty, I I I don't think it's a plausible account of what congress was doing in the DC militia code to say that congress expected the president to rely on his general federalization authority. That's a statute that applies to whole state national guards.
00:06:32
As I mentioned at the at the outset, what they were trying to do is to make the DC, national guard in its militia capacity comparable to a state national guard. And this is a point I think is quite striking about their interpretation under which the only thing the president can do with the DC national guard apart from training exercises is suppress riots at the request of a local official. That means that if the District Of Columbia were subject to a foreign invasion, war of eighteen twelve situation. The president would lack authority on their account of the DC militia code to activate the DC National Guard in its militia capacity to repel that invasion. They haven't cited a single example of a state governor who lacked authority to use the state national guard to repel an invasion.
00:07:19
That's, I
00:07:19
think, a very commonly core accepted function of a state national guard would be to repel.
00:07:24
And it is, of course, typically spelled out explicitly that they have that authority. So one issue here might be that congress hasn't updated this since 1889. Right?
00:07:34
I I think that I think
00:07:35
guards have been.
00:07:36
I think that is a flaw in the interpretation right from the very beginning that you would interpret provision that designates the president of The United States, the commander in chief of the DC militia, and does not give him any discretionary authority to deploy the guard for any purpose. On their view, the only thing he can do is respond to a request from a local official to put down a riot. They haven't cited a single state militia code that limited the state governor's authority in that fashion.
00:08:06
But it's, I mean, it's a little bit of a technicality because the request comes from the mayor, the US marshal for the district, or the national capital service director, and that aren't two of those presidential appointees that the president can just say, can you make this request?
00:08:22
I I think that's correct, but I don't think that makes it any more plausible that congress would have conditioned the president's authority to, for example, repel a foreign invasion, which I don't think he could actually do under the terms of one zero three even with a request. I don't think it's plausible that congress conditioned the president's authority to act in the face of a violent riot and exigency on awaiting a request from one of these pre listed officials, particularly when the language of one zero three isn't framed as a limitation on the president's authority. It's actually framed as a command to the president. What that provision in effect does is identifies three additional officials who are, as a practical matter, empowered to cause the guard to be deployed to address a riot. But I think the key point here is they haven't cited any state militia code that so severely limited the governor's authority to only that circumstance.
00:09:17
They do cite militia codes that contain a provision that's analogous to section one zero three. For example, they cite section 77, I believe, of the New Jersey militia code, which has a provision that's almost identical to section one zero three. What they failed to mention is the immediately preceding section of the New Jersey code broadly authorizes the governor to call out the the state guard, in case of e verse... Invasion or other emergency.
00:09:45
Let me ask you in light of past practice. You cite a number of examples, most of which are based on Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice opinions based on interpreting specific authorizations to do something, whether it's drug, Internet, diction, or as you say, riots. Is that a limiting principle that over time has been established on the president's authority as to calling out and deploying the DC National Guard as commander in chief?
00:10:32
I do think, judge Rogers, that the historical practice strongly supports our position as to limiting principles.
00:10:38
Understand you do, but the authorities you cite all cite explicit authorizations. That's what I'm getting at. A court may decide you are correct, but I'm just trying to understand what this court should understand was congressional intent as at least from the authorities you cite of where the federal government, the Department of Justice and the Office of Legal Counsel had looked at a specific authorization by Congress to do certain things with the National Guard. And you acknowledged that, you know, these state guards are subject to subject to all kinds of local controls under state law. So the analogy would be if the commander in chief is set up like a governor, so too, the office of legal counsel was viewing, well, there's a specific authorization by Congress to to, quote, use the DC National Guard for certain purposes, not just anything he decides he wants to do with the guard.
00:11:57
I I think... I don't think your argument goes quite that far.
00:12:00
It does not.
00:12:01
Right. Alright. So if the guard were deployed to do things that were never interpreted under a state system for the guard to do, the president would not have, quote, that inherent authority. I'm just trying to understand what the limiting principle is.
00:12:21
Right. So I I think that's essentially right. I might phrase it a little bit differently, judge Rogers. I think the limiting principle in our position is the president has to be calling out the guard in aid of the civil authorities. That's an authority that appears throughout the DC militia code.
00:12:37
I understand. But the way it's been interpreted heretofore, at least when the issues come before the office of legal counsel, there was a specific statutory provision. Now you can argue whether there is such here, but that is a limiting principle. It's not sort of, well, the president says crime is out of control, so he can just call out the guard and do whatever he wants. Alright?
00:13:03
Rather, you acknowledge that under article one, congress, you know, is in charge, basically, of the District Of Columbia. And as part of the president's budget, he includes requests by the city for law enforcement, and congress may appropriate money in accord with that. And then, at least historically here, we have the situation where the mayor is asking that appropriated funds be released to the city, for law enforcement purposes, and they're not. So what I'm trying to understand is in a state system, if the state legislature had authorized funding for additional hiring... Additional police officers, alright, because the city had identified a need.
00:14:01
Does that take priority over any assignment for the National Guard?
00:14:10
Yeah. I think that would depend on the particulars of the relevant Well,
00:14:14
I'm with you right here because the mayor asked for release of, what was it, $30,000,000. Alright? That was to hire more police officers and other law enforcement officials, etcetera. Alright? Wasn't released.
00:14:29
Alright. So the president says... And remember, this is part of the president's request in the appropriation act to provide this additional funding for the city. And, apparently, even though it was enacted and Congress authorized it, it wasn't released to the mayor. Right?
00:14:55
And so the president says, but I have this authority to use the guard in aid of civil authorities. So if the president is just acting in the form of a governor, if Congress had appropriated money for the state of Arizona to hire more police officers to combat crime, where where are we?
00:15:27
I don't think any decisions congress makes without appropriations would limit the president's authority, preexisting authority under the I
00:15:34
disagree in in, I think, the sense you're stating it. But what I'm trying to understand is the president says crime's out of control. Alright? I wanna do something. So he puts in his budget.
00:15:51
Give the city more money for law enforcement. And congress says, we agree. Article one. Alright? President, article two.
00:16:05
I don't need your brief to doubt that under article one, Congress is the superior authority as to the District Of Columbia.
00:16:15
That is correct.
00:16:16
You're not arguing here that the president is somehow an article two power as he is for the executive branch. You're saying he's like a state governor. So he may have authority, but I'm trying to understand if congress says it decides that the city ought to get this $30,000,000 for law enforcement purposes, is there any obligation, or is it just a matter of supremacy that that money must go to the city for law enforcement? Alright? And then as the city recruits, trains, hires, the president says, it's still out of control, so I'm gonna deploy the guard.
00:17:09
That's a different scenario than we have here. And I'm trying to understand what The United States' position is where you're here representing the president as a, quote, governor of a state. And if you were in Arizona, could the governor act contrary or just ignore what congress has said should go to the state of Arizona?
00:17:42
I I don't know any of the particulars of Arizona state
00:17:45
law, but
00:17:45
what I
00:17:45
would say is you are. But I the hypothetical.
00:17:48
Right. What I would I'm trying to understand. If you're arguing that you acknowledge the congress's authority under article one Correct. And the president in submitting his budget also acknowledges that authority. And congress says, in my hypothetical, give the city $30,000,000 more for law enforcement because the city says it needs to hire a thousand more police officers.
00:18:20
Alright? The president doesn't give the city that money. Rather, he calls out the guard. So I'm just trying to understand. If you're going to take this guard analogy to a state governor, then aren't you necessarily limited by what congress has decreed the city shall get?
00:18:49
I don't think the president's authority over the guard is limited by appropriations decisions. That's one tool the president has if he sees that there's a crime epidemic that's competing the functions of the federal government. Certainly, that's one tool he has, to go to congress and ask for additional funds to support expanded law enforcement. Use that authority. I...
00:19:10
But whether he didn't
00:19:11
the money over to the city. That's what I'm getting at. Now I'm not suggesting that everything else you say, the state governor could do. But I'm just wondering in this very unique circumstance
00:19:29
where,
00:19:31
you know, the founding fathers decided it was an article one power, not an article two power as to what happens in the District Of Columbia.
00:19:40
And and we're relying on the statute that congress enacted pursuant to its article one power?
00:19:45
You're saying that that statute was designed as at least as I understood your brief and as your responses this morning to judge Garcia. You're saying the president is acting like a governor.
00:20:02
I think that is a fair parallel to draw that that was what congress was trying to do is to put the state... The DC National Guard on roughly the same footing as a state National Guard. And as the district has emphasized in its brief, state governors had generally looked to their state militia codes to discern what they were allowed to do with the state national guards. And we're not taking any different position with respect to the president under the DC militia code. We are relying on the same authorizations that the office of legal counsel pointed to in its analysis.
00:20:31
This, but I'm just trying to get to, and I know you don't wanna answer. But, if congress had said for the state of Arizona, I want that state to spend $30,000,000 more to hire a thousand police officers, local police officers, state police officers, state troopers. Is the president obligated to turn that money over?
00:21:01
I don't know the answer to the question or any of the facts about failing to turn money over. What I can say is that there's nothing in the DC militia code that imposes any sort of exhaustion requirement that congress... That the president first go to congress.
00:21:14
But the question in my mind is what's the limiting principle on the president acting as governor of the District Of Columbia for purposes of calling out the DC National Guard.
00:21:26
So I
00:21:27
think the center argument, as I understand it this morning, is, basically, if he makes a decision that we need law enforcement, he can call out the guard, the DC National Guard as commander in chief in aid of civil authorities. That's as far as you take your argument.
00:21:49
I do think that is correct, and I would acknowledge that it is a broad authority that we think congress conferred on the president here in his capacity as commander in chief. But I think aid of civil authorities is a real limitation, so he has to be pursuing something that the civil authorities could themselves lawfully pursue, and I don't think the militia code would give the president any license to violate other statutory or constitutional limits on what the civil authorities can do. But I will acknowledge it is a broad authority, and I don't think that's surprising when as we've discussed, the president... The congress was trying to place the president in the same basic role as a state governor. And many state greater
00:22:32
role is really my point.
00:22:34
Even if it's... Even if I accept that premise, many, many state governors in 1889 and many, many governors today have the same exact authority that we're saying congress gave the president, which is to deploy the state national guard to aid the civil authorities in executing the laws.
00:22:49
And how does that not just collapse into federalizing DCNG? I mean, in a way that just isn't present when you have a state governor as a separately elected and accountable state official. I mean, what I undertook the disc... What I understand the district court to be concerned with was giving DC law some role in in rendering meaningful the difference between the hybrid title 32 status and federalization? And what's what's your argument that that this is not federalization and therefore running up against posse commutatus?
00:23:31
So I think there's I think there's a big difference between the federalization statute and the DC militia code. I mean, one that goes directly to this point, we're talking about aiding aiding the civil authorities. If you look at the supreme court's recent decision in Trump versus Illinois, they construed the prong of the federalization statute that deals with federalizing state national guards to, assist with enforcement of the law. And, of course, that is a very, very narrow authority that the president can only invoke when the federal military is both legally authorized and factually unable to address the law execution problem with the regular military. Okay?
00:24:11
So that's an extraordinarily limited authority, and it would be quite surprising if congress had intended that limitation to apply on activation of the DC National Guard. No state governor, of course, has to first exhaust the federal military before deploying the state national guard to assist with law execution within the state. So I think I think these are really apples and oranges, what the DC national guard can do in its militia capacity versus what state national guards, including the DC Guard, can do when they are federalized. And that's one place where I think the district's brief really steals a base. They try to expand what the president can do under the militia code by pointing to section one two four zero six.
00:24:57
But our point to section one two four zero six doesn't authorize the, DC card in its militia capacity to do any of the things that state national guards could traditionally do. So on their reading of the code, the DC card... DC National Guard couldn't do any of that stuff. It couldn't repel an invasion. Let me give you let me give you just a a list of other things.
00:25:18
I
00:25:19
think there are... There were some states where there's not a general authorization to assist in civil law enforcement.
00:25:26
I I think that is correct. There were some, but there were also many that didn't. Right. And our point here is if you look at the terms of the DC militia code, it, I think, establishes that Congress followed the model of those states that did generally authorize the governor to call out the state guard to assist with law execution. Let let me just give you a list of things that the DC National Guard has historically done for decades, sometimes at the request of the mayor of DC that the DC National Guard could not do under their reading of the code.
00:26:02
DC National Guard has has consistently been deployed to assist law enforcement with presidential inaugurations. They have been deployed to assist with large demonstrations in the district, again, to support law enforcement. They have been deployed to assist with natural disasters. DC National Guard deployed during hurricane Katrina to help with the disaster relief efforts. They've been deployed during pandemics.
00:26:25
Mayor Bowser herself requested deployment of the DC National Guard during the COVID pandemic, and the guard was activated to assist with the pandemic relief efforts. Drug interdiction under section one twelve of title 32. That's a statute to where Congress specifically authorized title two, title 32 status state national guards to do drug interdiction missions and said it's gotta be separately authorized under state law in order for this to be federally authorized. On their view of the DC militia code, DC could not participate in the drug interdiction program because there's no provision of the militia code that specifically authorizes the guard to be activated for drug interdiction.
00:27:05
But on the district court's view, as long as the mayor requests, they could.
00:27:11
That is incorrect, judge Pillard. The request is only one of the conditions in section one zero three. Section one zero three is about riot suppression. So you have to have both a request from one of the three listed officials, and you have to meet the various conditions. There has to be a mob, Tomo, riot, or some similar body of men gathered to break the law.
00:27:32
So that's a that's a very narrow provision that's specifically focused on riot suppression. It wouldn't authorize any of these other things. Wouldn't authorize pandemic relief, wouldn't authorize drug interdiction, wouldn't authorize help with demonstrations and inaugurations. It really is an extraordinarily narrow vision of the DC Guard that they are pressing you
00:27:52
to accept. Do not not if you read, for example, DC code 49405 as long as the obligations under one zero three, which are in response to a request from the mayor or US marshal or national capital service director, then the the, president, in response to such a request, can call up, any portion of the enrolled militia whenever it shall be necessary. But you're saying that is in turn limited by the constraints of one zero three.
00:28:30
Yeah. I don't think nine zero one says that you can call up the guard whenever it shall be necessary. I think it's saying the reverse of that, whenever it is necessary to call up the guard for one of these purposes, and then it specifies the date. One? You're looking at 09/2001?
00:28:46
No. Oh, I'm sorry. You're looking at 04/2005.
00:28:49
I was looking at 04/2005.
00:28:50
Yeah. I think it's the same thing. I I don't think that
00:28:53
agreeing that 404405 are not affirmative authority to call out the DC Guard.
00:28:59
That's correct. I do not view them as separate fonts of authority. I do think they're relevant to the statutory interpretation here, but not as separate fonts of authority. The the fonts of authority that we're pointing to are the designation of the president as commander in chief and section one zero two. I think the
00:29:16
Can I ask you about? I don't wanna cut off other questions about the DC code if my colleagues have them, but you started by saying you thought there were two sources of authority. Was the second one five zero two f?
00:29:28
That is correct.
00:29:31
So I'll just ask my question about that. You agree that five zero two f does not override state law limits on State Guard activities?
00:29:40
Yes. I think that's another point of common ground between us and the district.
00:29:43
But it seems to me that your argument is that it does override DC law limits on the DC Guard. Otherwise, five zero two f isn't an independent source of authority. It just redounds to what we've been talking about, whether the DC code authorizes this.
00:29:59
In essence, I think that's correct. I I don't think I would say that it is overriding limits in the DC militia code. I think it is simply a separate source.
00:30:08
More more directly, if DC... If the DC code does not authorize what the DC Guard is doing here, do you agree that five zero two f cannot supply that authority?
00:30:20
No. We disagree with that. We we think that...
00:30:23
If it's... It wouldn't have that effect as to a state.
00:30:27
Because DC is differently situated vis a vis congress than a state. Obviously, the DC National Guard is solely a creature of federal law, and it is governed exclusively by federal law. And Congress has plenary authority over the DC National Guard, and nothing requires Congress to legislate with respect to the DC National Guard solely in the militia code. It is free to enact other statutes that give additional authorities to the DC National Guard, and that's our view of section five zero two f.
00:30:57
It just seems strange to say... Seems like there's one question in enacting five zero two f. Did congress intend to provide affirmative additional deployment authority? And it should either be yes or no. But your answer is no as to states, yes as to DC.
00:31:14
Yes. So I I think I what
00:31:15
I'm struggling with. Yeah.
00:31:16
I think I view the question slightly differently. The way I view section five zero two f when it says that guard members may be ordered to perform to perform training or other duty, including supportive missions requested by the president. I think that is saying that this mission is substantively authorized for purposes of federal law. Okay? Mhmm.
00:31:40
For purposes of federal law. That doesn't supplant any limits under state law, but it does provide all the authority that is needed under federal law for the commanding general of the DC National Guard to order out the card to support the mission requested by the president.
00:31:58
DC does identify a federal regulation that appears to say that you need state authority and to define DC as a state for purposes of that regulation. Do you know what I'm referring to? I don't think you all addressed that in your reply brief. Is there some reason that's inapplicable or not binding?
00:32:17
Not that it's not binding. I don't think there's anything in that regulation that specifically addresses DC. It talks about if you're dealing with a state governor deploying the, state guard that that has to be separately authorized under state law, but there's nothing specifically that that addresses the district in that regulation that I saw. And I and I would emphasize again the implication of the argument that they're making here. If you combine their understanding of the DC militia code, where only thing you can do is riot suppression, with their understanding of five zero two f, which they say supplies no independent authority, it's just about funding, The DC National Guard could never participate in a five zero two f mission at the request of the president unless it happened to involve suppressing a riot in the District Of Columbia.
00:33:08
As I mentioned
00:33:08
It's not...
00:33:09
I mean, I... You're reading it interestingly narrowly. At least I take it you're talking about forty nine one zero three in the DC code. It seems broader to me than just about riots. It's it's
00:33:25
two molds.
00:33:27
People acting together by force with attempt to commit a felony or violence against persons or property or by force or violence to break and resist the laws. So there's a lot of activity that resisting the laws. I mean, you don't think a foreign invasion would be resisting the laws?
00:33:48
I don't think this provision could fairly be read to cover a foreign invasion. No. Just pillared among other reasons because I think it's impossible to imagine that congress would have conditioned the president's authority to repel a foreign invasion on a request from one
00:34:01
of these three officials. Well, the the president has the entire United States military.
00:34:07
He does, but I don't think that makes it any more plausible that congress said you can't use the DC Guard in its militia capacity for that, which is a well accepted
00:34:16
takes is a request, and two of the three people who are listed as requesting are people that the president controls. It's not much of a speed bump. It just is one.
00:34:29
But it's not it's not it's not just the request. I think the terms of this provision aren't naturally read to encompass a foreign invasion. I think it's gotta be something that's at least similar to a tumult riot or a mob, and those aren't terms that would naturally be used to describe a foreign invading army.
00:34:45
A body of men acting together by force to offer violence to persons or property.
00:34:51
Yeah. I... And I think I would read that sort of language in light of the preceding terms. It seems to me a real stretch that that would pick up a foreign invading army, particularly when this language is drawn from state militia codes that consistently dealt separately with repelling invasions and suppressing riots. But even setting aside the the example of invasions, there are all the other things that I pointed to, inaugurations, demonstrations, drug interdiction, natural disasters, pandemics.
00:35:19
None of that is even arguably arguably picked up by section one zero three. So on the district's reading of the code and five zero two f, the DC National Guard could never do any of those things, including things that mayor Bowser herself has previously requested that the DC National Guard do.
00:35:39
Good question about the district's irreparable harms here. So one area of dispute is the mayor's statutory authority over law enforcement. And I understand your your lead argument is essentially the mayor doesn't have exclusive authority over law enforcement. So adding a federal sort of another law enforcement force doesn't intrude on that statutory authority. Is that basically right?
00:36:07
I'm sure...
00:36:08
I think that is basically correct. That is the main point. Yeah.
00:36:11
And then if they had a declaration that said, you know, here are concrete ways in which the presence of the guard is interfering with law enforcement efforts the mayor would like to carry out and detailed what that interference was. Would that suffice? Would that be a cognizable I
00:36:29
think that might well suffice as a reparable harm, and their problem here is they have nothing like that. They haven't pointed to any way in which the deployment of the guard has interfered with their law enforcement efforts. I mean, the guard is largely providing a presence at... In high traffic areas like national parks, metro stations, union stations providing a presence. And what they do if they witness a crime, they call 911.
00:36:52
They call the police. So there there is a presence to help deter crime. I don't see how that is in any way interfering with the district's authority over law enforcement, particularly when... And I think this is a key flaw in the district court's understanding that authority is not exclusive. The district court said that law enforcement authority decisions about how best to do crime...
00:37:13
To deter crime are reserved to the district. That is simply incorrect. The federal government has its own interests and role to play. For example, the park police are authorized to enforce DC law in the same manner as the Metropolitan Police. Obviously, the president has his own article two function to perform in ensuring that federal personnel, property, and functions are safe from violent crime.
00:37:36
So the federal government has its own interests. I mean, you know, maybe one way you could think about this, judge Garcia, to pick up on, the question that judge Rogers was asking me. I mean, suppose instead of activating the DC National Guard, the president has said, I'm gonna hire additional park police so that we can relieve the people who are patrolling them all and have them go support the DC police department. That's essentially what the National Guard is doing is patrolling those areas, freeing up the park police to go assist with law enforcement in the district. I don't see how that would irreparably harm the district in any way, and I don't think it differs simply because it was an activation of the guard as opposed to hiring more police officers that freed up the officers to go and do law enforcement in the district.
00:38:21
Yes. One other question. We haven't talked much about the state guards, and the district, does have an alternative argument that the constitution imposes a structural constraint on inviting state guards into the into the district without express cons... Statutory authority. And I guess as a predicate to that, do you have a view about whether one state guard can be deployed into another state without the receiving state's consent as a constitutional matter?
00:38:59
I think likely not. I mean, the the state's jurisdiction is bounded by its territory, and it's also bounded by the co equal sovereignty of its sister states. So I I think a state governor very likely could not deploy that state's card into a non consenting state.
00:39:19
And so the analogy I think DC might say is it it sure ought to follow that that a state can't send its guard into the District Of Columbia without Congress's consent. Congress has plenary authority in the district, not the president. And what we're missing here is an affirmative manifestation of consent by Congress. Why isn't that why doesn't that necessarily follow?
00:39:48
I think there are two problems with that. One is I think Congress has authorized the president to consent in both five zero two f and the DC militia code. But separately, I don't think that congressional action would always be necessary to authorize the president to consent to a deployment of a state guard in the district. I mean, again, let's imagine that there were a a foreign invasion of the District Of Columbia. I think the president's article two authority as commander in chief would authorize him to request and accept state National Guard assistance in repelling that invasion in the District Of Columbia.
00:40:22
I don't think it's all that different here when he's requested a mission to help him perform his
00:40:26
He couldn't do that in a state if it was contrary to state law.
00:40:31
Even conceding that, I think the District Of Columbia is different because we're not dealing with any state sovereignty concerns. The district is not a sovereign. It is a federal enclave. And I think the president has inherent cost... Constitutional authority, at least in certain circumstances, without any congressional authorization to request and accept state guard assistance to help him perform his constitutional duties in the District Of Columbia.
00:40:57
So I think you've already answered this with respect to a question from judge Garcia, but section five zero two f is is uniquely sufficient in your view for DC Guard deployments without the need to comply with DC's version of a state militia code because of its separate enclave status. So there's... Article two is doing more work for you in DC than you're willing to say it could do in a state in analogous
00:41:26
I I I guess I don't see article two doing the work on our interpretation of five zero two f. I think it's the plain language of that statute may be ordered. May be ordered is most naturally read as an authorization. And as I said before, I think that language means, in essence, may be ordered so far as federal law is concerned. I think you would need clearer language from congress to purport to authorize a state governor to deploy the state guard in a title 32 status under state command and control than what we have in five zero two f.
00:42:05
And so I think as a matter of avoidance, you would read five zero two f not to purport to allow a state governor to deploy the guard in contravention of state law. But that avoidance canon doesn't apply with respect to the DC National Guard, which is solely a creature of federal law. And I do wanna be clear. It's not two different interpretations that we're applying. I think that avoidance canon leads to one unified interpretation, That unified interpretation being this is whatever substantive federal authority is needed to deploy the guard is being provided by five zero two f.
00:42:41
The difference is that is sufficient for the guard because they are governed only by Congress and only by federal law where it is whereas it is insufficient for states because they are governed by a separate body of state law.
00:42:57
Thank you. We'll give you your rebuttal time. Thank you. Morning. Good
00:43:11
morning, your honor. May it please the court. For over a year, thousand... Thousands of National Guard troops have been, have been patrolling the streets of District Of Columbia, detaining suspects, assisting in the execution of warrants, and otherwise enforcing the law. In order to justify this extraordinary and indefinite deployment of military power in an American city, defendants would need to identify some statute or constitutional provision that authorizes it.
00:43:37
But as to both the DC guard and the out of state guard units patrolling the district, they have failed to do so. As the DC guard, congress has enacted a statute. We've discussed at length already this morning. The DC militia code of 1889 that delineates with precision the circumstances in which the president can deploy the DC guard. That statute, like most militia codes of the era, authorizes the president to deploy the guard in response to specific exigencies, invasions, insurrections, riots, and other breaches of the peace.
00:44:07
I heard my opponents suggest that this code is somehow different than other militia codes of the era because it doesn't expressly authorize deployments in response to insurrections and invasions. But that premise, which seemed to serve as a load bearing pillar of their arguments, is demonstrably false. First, the DC code, by its terms, authorizes the president to call into the service of The United States, the DC Guard, And a long standing statute in effect when congress enacted the DC Militia Code, 16 rev stat sixteen forty two, authorize the president to to call the guard of any state into federal service in in response to insurrections, invasions, and and like, like events. I think it's obvious from the DC militia code, congress understood that authority to apply to DC. Otherwise, there would have been no circumstances in which the president can call the guard into the service of The United States.
00:44:56
In any event, as my opponent conceded, in nineteen o three, Congress removed any conceivable doubt on that score by expressly defining states in that statute to include the District Of Columbia. So the DC militia code confers an affirmative authority closely analogous to that conferred by the large majority of states at the time. And I heard my opponent to make a key concession in his opening statement, which is that the DC Militia code could... Should be construed to confer authority similar to that conferred by other codes at the time and to give the president's authority analogous that, granted to other governors at the time. And I think that resolves this case.
00:45:34
The DC militia code grants that that limited set of power to deploy the Guardian Exigencies, not a broader power unknown to the code of most states to deploy the DC militia in any circumstance the president deems proper. In their brief senate arguments, I heard... I've I've put the government appears to argue that a series of vague and ancillary provisions in the DC code confer a much broader authority on the president, the power to deploy the DC Guard in essentially any circumstance the president wishes. I'll just note that I heard for the first time at the podium, defendants suggest that the limiting principle on their theory is that the DC Guard can only be deployed to, quote, aid the civil authorities. But my friend's understanding of that power was that they can perform any function the civil authorities of the district can perform.
00:46:20
That would be an extraordinarily broad power, conferred on the president to use a federal military force for civil functions, something at odd at odds with the basic premise of our constitutional system and the limits on the role of the military. And in any event, there's no textual basis for even that limit in their arguments, which why in a much broader, and undefined power vested in the president.
00:46:42
So under your argument, who defines what is an exigency?
00:46:47
So I I think that the relevant provisions answer answer that question. Section 49 dash one zero three says that when there is a riot, tumult, mob, etcetera, in the district, it's one of the three civil officials listed in that provision that needs to call for the president's aid. Judge Pillard, as you pointed out, two of those officials are the president's subordinates. So the president is free to order those subordinates to make a request for his aid, something that in fact president Trump did in 2020 when he invoked 49 dash one zero three, to instruct the US marshal to call for the aid of the DC Guard in response to violence following the
00:47:23
So why would congress contemplate a situation where the governor concerned about exigencies has to wait for another official, even his appointee or her appointee, to ask.
00:47:42
So I don't think the statute does that because it has additional authority that's within the president under the federalization provisions, what's now codified, in 12... In 10 USC twelve four zero six. The president can call the guard into the service of The United States, during an invasion and insurrection or as my friend, acknowledged where the federal military is able to enforce... Has a legal authority to enforce the laws but can't do so. So that would be, an authority vested in the president.
00:48:09
Of course, you'd have to have a plausible basis.
00:48:11
You just said that you understand that the president has authority to call out the DC National Guard in the case of exigencies.
00:48:24
Yes, your honor.
00:48:24
And I asked you who defines exigencies. And you say, basically, the president has to wait, alright, for the mayor and the two other officials he's appointed to ask. And I'm saying, how does that rationally reveal what congress had in mind? As you know, probably better than I, The police power in DC was a very controversial issue
00:48:56
Yes, sir.
00:48:57
When congress was determining what authorities to delegate. And I don't see anything, and that's what I'm trying to get you to tell me, that says that somehow the president's hands are tied even more than a governor's hands would be tied.
00:49:22
So so your honor
00:49:22
Because it talks about when the governor says there's an exigency where the local guard is needed, the governor can call it out unless state law says you can only do it for the following six reasons.
00:49:38
Yes, your honor. So two answers to this. One is that certain exigencies do not require a request from even the local civil officials in the district. The exigencies listed in 10 USC twelve four zero six only require a determination by the president that those exigencies are present. That includes invasions, insurrections, and cases where the army is unable to execute the laws.
00:49:59
So those would not even require what you, judge Piller, referred to as the procedural speedboat.
00:50:03
Governor says, I've got a riot on my hands. I've got crime that's out of control.
00:50:11
Yes.
00:50:12
I need the guard, the state guard to come in. No authority?
00:50:17
Yes. Absolutely authority. And in fact, the very authority president Trump himself invoked in 2020 to deploy the DC guard to deal with unrest following the killing of George Floyd, he instructed his subordinates to make a request under 49 dash one zero three. And that is not in any way unusual in light of militia codes of that era. As my opponent acknowledged
00:50:38
So the failure here is the president didn't request a subordinate to request?
00:50:43
That's not the only failure. I think there's... It's But
00:50:46
I'm trying to track this down because we're looking for the limiting principles. Because you're in the district, actually, is arguing the president can't just wake up one morning and decide he's gonna employ the guard. Yes. There are limited circumstances where he can do that. But you say exigencies.
00:51:08
So the president puts out this order saying the city's lost control over crime. And indeed, in his budget request, he asked for all this money to help the district regain control. And the mayor says, you know, we need all these extra officers. I don't understand where you get the limits on the president's authority to define an exigency like a governor could.
00:51:41
So two points in response to, judge Rogers. Even governors, they were limited to specific exigencies listed in the statute, invasions, insurrections, riot, etcetera. They would
00:51:51
have It's out of control.
00:51:53
That would not ordinarily, in in militia codes of the time, be a basis for for deploying the the national guard of of most states.
00:52:00
So what would the governor do? Crime's out of control, says the governor. I'm serious about this.
00:52:06
Yes. In the 1889, I think a critical element for resolving this case correctly is understanding what national guards were used for in 1889. That was a... It was a much more constrained body than we understand most national guards to be today. Over the past hundred forty years, most states have amended their codes to enable the national guard to be deployed in response to disasters for general aid and crime fighting.
00:52:30
In 1889, the large majority of states did not allow National Guards to be used for that purpose. They were used as a, reserve military force for true emergencies. And most states
00:52:41
We have these specific authorizations that the office of legal counsel
00:52:45
Yes.
00:52:46
Has identified. And all of these federal activities that, counsel was just reciting have been sufficient. So the president says, goodness. You know, somebody who works for me is mauled in the streets three blocks from the White House. Crime is out of control.
00:53:10
I need to do something.
00:53:12
So so, your honor, in some circumstances, it would be entirely lawful and appropriate for the president to invoke section 49 dash one zero three. In that circumstance, if there's any kind of organized violence in the district, the president can deploy the guard for the purpose of suppressing the same. But it is telling that defendants at no point in this case, including here today, have suggested that forty nine zero three can serve as the basis for this deployment. That's because there is no plausible contention that for a period of four years, the length of this unprecedented deployment, there is an ongoing riot mob, tumbled, or or similar disturbance, nor that the deployment of the guard is limited to suppressing the same.
00:53:48
Well, in fairness, I think that the question is four years ago was there a basis? Now the fact the president's arguing what I've done has been successful. Alright. So the fact that it's no longer out of control. I mean, I don't think you can use that as an argument, but I want to understand why you think the president, like a governor, seeing that his state police force is way underfunded, lots of vacancies, needs money to hire more officers.
00:54:27
And the president says, you know, well, appropriations take time. I'm gonna deploy the National Guard because crime is out of control.
00:54:37
Yes. And so to answer this question directly about the authority of governors, most... Many state laws of the state militia codes at the time had a provision very closely analogous to section 49 of one zero three. And in many of those states, that was the sole means of invoking the aid of the guard to resolve... To address mobs, riots, hummels, or similar disturbances.
00:54:58
We cite a case from the Washington Supreme Court in 1891, Chapinbee Ferry, that talks about that those states that authorized the deployment of the guard to aid the civil authorities, hedged that authority about with procedural and substantive safeguards precisely because sending military forces, even state military forces, to engage in local law enforcement was an extremely unusual power in our system.
00:55:19
Was there any state that conditioned that authority even if that was the only authority on the request of a subordinate?
00:55:27
Yes. Many states. There were...
00:55:28
There are certainly several that have a provision that allow a subordinate to make the request. Everyone I saw, Georgia, New Jersey, then had another provision saying the governor could do it unilaterally as well.
00:55:40
Yes. I I believe there are some circumstances that... I I I think there's two answers, your honor. One is that as as the as the cases of that era construe it, both Chapin b Ferry and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Ela v Smith. Those courts seem to understand the those 49 dash one zero three like provisions as the way for the president to send out the guard to aid the civil authorities.
00:56:04
So there might be a general authorization for the president to aid those civil authorities. But it appears those courts construed that as referring to the specific provision allowing him to send them to aid them, and that's partly because of the words aid to civil authorities. What these cases say is aid to civil authorities puts the military under the supervision of the of the local civil authorities who request their their aid and only allows us to perform those functions that the local civil authorities request. That's what Ela v Smith is about. And and, again, Chapin v.
00:56:33
Ferri talks about how that's a critical limit on this unusual power, that governors were not generally given the authority to deploy the guard for general law enforcement. They needed a request, and they needed deployment to be closely limited to resolving the exigency that gave rise to the request. So judge Rogers, this would not have been an unusual limit on the president. And as it operates in DC, it's even less of a limit on the president than it would have been on governors because two of those officials are his subordinates. He can, with a a phone call or the stroke of a pen, order those subordinates to make a request as, again, he has previously and recently done.
00:57:08
And what has what has been the practice, mister MacArthur just argued that your reading requiring, a mission or an operation, pursuant to five zero two f to have separate authorization under DC, militia code would have precluded many recent missions that have deployed the DC Guard, like drug interdictions, natural disasters, pandemic relief. Do you know whether in those situations the the request was made?
00:57:47
Or
00:57:48
Yes, your honor. The the... Those... Most of those deployments rested on a independent statutory authority that is not at issue in this case, which is DC code five dash one twenty nine point o three, which is a provision that authorizes the mayor to appoint a special police, any citizen in circumstances, both emergencies of various kinds, emergency, pestilence, riot, and days of public celebration, election, or ceremony. That is the authority the mayor has generally invoked, for instance, to allow National Guard to assist during inauguration, days of public ceremony.
00:58:20
It's, this case doesn't present the question of the scope of that authority, but that has been the authority often used in that circumstance. In cases where the DC Guard has been employed... Deployed to engage in law enforcement, the... As you point out, judge Rogers, even OLC has always identified what they believe to be an affirmative basis in the statute, to use that authority. And the cases where it's actually been done have been in 1968 in the riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King.
00:58:48
The president invoked the Insurrection Act and got a request from local authorities under forty nine one zero three. And in the... In 2020, he got a request under 49 dash one zero three. The historical record is entirely bare as to examples in which the president has deployed the guard to engage in law enforcement without falling within one of the statutes specific grants of authority.
00:59:11
And the one that you mentioned, DC code five
00:59:14
Five dash one one twenty nine point o three.
00:59:16
O three is not in the, appendix that we have.
00:59:20
The, defendants cite this in their brief, and the district court pointed out that this has been the basis on which out of state guard units have often been allowed to assist during inaugurations. In turn...
00:59:34
We talked about the state guards. Yes, sir. If you assume the EMAC does not bar the deployment of the state guards, you have a few alternative arguments. And as the federal government points out, we do have a case Shirley v Sebelius which suggests that we do not have authority to affirm on an alternative legal ground. Do you have, do you think we can reach those arguments?
00:59:58
And if so, why?
00:59:59
Yes,
00:59:59
your honor. I think there's decisive authority in the contrary direction. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court in the Trump v Cook case affirmed a preliminary injunction, on a different basis than the district court had done. The district court, as your honors well know, enjoined the removal of Lisa
01:00:16
The supreme court is not bound by our circuit precedent.
01:00:19
Yes. But the supreme court expressly addressed this question. It it it... The district court had enjoined the removal of Lisa Cook based on constitutional grounds. The supreme court, denied a stay of that injunction on statutory grounds.
01:00:31
Justice Alito in dissent objected that that was improper for the... Based on the same arguments the defendants are making here. The, the court in a footnote rejects that argument categorically. It says, we review judgments, not opinions. Defend...
01:00:44
The plaintiffs had raised these arguments below. They were properly presented, and therefore, the court could affirm on a on a different basis. And it made clear that was true both at the stay stage and at final judgment. So I think that is... I I think if the Supreme Court can do it and if, like, this case went to the Supreme Court and it could do so, it's obviously proper for this court to do so as well.
01:01:04
I'd also note that even Shirley v. Sebelius was much more tentative on this point than defendant suggested, said. We're not aware of prior cases that have done this. It it didn't suggest it was categorically improper. And in this case, what we are talking about are legal arguments that have been extensively briefed, just as a matter of prudence.
01:01:23
Argument about command
01:01:24
and control is does involve a factual dispute. You might tell me that that's not in serious dispute, but the the command structure of these state guards is in dispute. So that would at least not be a pure legal argument.
01:01:38
Yes, sir. And I'm happy to explain. I think it can be easily resolved on the undisputed materials. But in addition, it's just generally the case that when this court is reviewing district court opinions, it can affirm on any basis preserved below and present in the record even if it involves factual questions.
01:01:51
But isn't it different when it's a preliminary injunction, which ultimately is a matter for the district court's exercise of discretion?
01:01:58
I don't think that's right, your honor. First, I think Cook is to the contrary and on legal questions that the district court doesn't have discretion. It's it's... It... These are just legal legal issues that can be resolved, without weighing any equitable factors.
01:02:12
And even when it comes to equitable factors, this court, in circumstances where a district court denies a preliminary injunction, this court can reverse that decision, order the order the issue as a permanent injunction based on its own weighing of the equities. That's exactly what this court did. For instance, in your opinion, judge Rogers and District of Columbia v Newby, it, the district court had denied the injunction, finding there was no repable harm. This court disagreed, did its own weighing of the equities, and determined an injunction should properly be issued. So I think it's, of course, you're already true for purely legal questions, but it's even true for equitable determinations.
01:02:51
And on the basis for deploying deploy... Joining the deployment of out of out of state guard units, I think the easiest way to resolve this question is that if this court concludes the deployment of the DC guard is unlawful, the deployment of the out of state guard units is is premised on the on the lawfulness and continuation of the DC Guard deployments. The key documents which the district court stayed and enjoined the enforcement of, the memorandum of understanding between the DC Guard and the out of state units and the, secretary of defense's employment guidance. Both say the out of state guard units are being deployed to support the DC Guard. They are placed under the supervision of the DC Guard and have to follow its operational direction.
01:03:34
Those documents cannot lawfully be...
01:03:36
In that same paragraph, it says something very confusing, at least to me. It says the state guards remain under the command of whoever the state authority is. And correct, the next sentence does say they are under the operational control. And that gives rise to... I think that's why the district court in a footnote didn't resolve this question.
01:03:54
Well, even putting aside the command and control arguments, just on this first point, regardless of the extent of commands that the that the DC Guard exercises, that memorandum, which is, of course, a memorandum between the DC Guard and the out of state units, just cannot be carried out lawfully if the DC Guard cannot perform its mission. The entire memorandum involves an authorization granted by the DC Guard, support for the functions performed by the DC Guard, and at least, you know, granting them every benefit of the doubt as to what that MOU means, essential supervisory role by the DC Guard. And there's just no way that memorandum can continue of the DC Guard's appointment as unlawful. And I think the court can just stop its analysis there for the purposes of the out of state guard units. The DC Guard can't perform its mission.
01:04:39
Therefore, the documents authorizing the out of state units to support that mission are unlawful as well. Defendants in their brief suggest, well, maybe we could redeploy the the out of state units in a totally different posture with no involvement by the DC Guard. We don't think that would be lawful either, but that's not the question before this court. This is an APA case with a challenge to specific agency actions, and those agency actions are unlawful.
01:05:01
You make an argument about, the, objections to interstate deployment against the will of... Or interjurisdiction deployment against the will of the receiving jurisdiction, and you have them as kind of a standalone argument at the end of your brief. Is this a constitutional claim, or is it a constitutional reason to read a statute in a particular way? What... How do you bring this to ground?
01:05:34
What do
01:05:35
you take on
01:05:36
this argument?
01:05:37
I think this is ultimately grounded in the constitution and specifically the district clause of the constitution. As as judge Garcia pointed out, it's... I think it's undisputed. The government said this was very likely correct. One state can't deploy its military into another state without consent, and I think that applies with even heightened force to the district given that the district is expressly placed by the constitution under congress's exclusive jurisdiction.
01:06:02
And the very purpose of that clause was to prevent the seeding states that seeded territory to create the district from exercising their will over the capital. There's just no question Virginia cannot deploy its national guard to, unilaterally deploy its national guard to patrol the district. It needs consent from Congress or its delegate. So I think the question is So
01:06:23
why why doesn't the president's invitation, offer that announcement?
01:06:27
Yes. And I think as as your question suggested, your honor, there needs to be Congress' plenary authority over the district. As the court said in Sanchez, among many other cases, it determines to whom to delegate its authority and to what extent. There's a clear delegation of authority to the mayor. First, in the designation of the mayor as the city's chief executive officer who exercises the executive power of the district.
01:06:49
Just like the governor, she can determine... And and incidentally, the official who, oversees the preserving the public peace and preventing crime and and protecting safety in the district. Pursuant to those authorities, she has a... She clearly has authority to consent to other jurisdictions assisting in law enforcement. Beyond that, there's an...
01:07:09
There's a multistate compact that Congress has ratified that expressly vest such authority in the mayor to consent to the deployment of out of state unit... National guard units into the district.
01:07:18
But I'm just commanding general of the DC National Guard.
01:07:22
Yes. And and so I think the question is, what is on the other side of the ledger that would give the president parallel authority? The president has very narrow sets of authority in the district, extremely narrow sets of authorities. And I heard my friends who suggest two sources of authority to consent. One is his designation as commander in chief of the DC National Guard.
01:07:41
But as, as his colloquy with you, judge judge Garcia, suggested, the designation of... As commander in chief is in all militia codes of the era simply a designation of command. It's not a grant of any substantive authority. Cases of the era expressly say that multiple courts consider what the term commander in chief meant, and they said it does not block Commonwealth, Pennsylvania v small, among others, said it does not confer any implicit authority beyond what's granted by the statute. And so I I don't think it grants...
01:08:15
When Congress, borrowed this well established term in all other militia codes and put it in the DC code, I think it stands to reason it took the old soil with it, and the term means the same thing in the DC code as it means in other statutes.
01:08:28
It means command. It doesn't mean
01:08:30
Any grant of substantive authority beyond what's granted in the code and certainly not the authority to deploy troops. Beyond that, it can't be the case that if the president can't deploy the DC guard to engage in law enforcement district, Somehow his authority as commander in chief over the guard allows him to summon other states to do the very thing he's forbidden from doing with his own forces. So I don't think that arguments can be right. And then I heard my friends suggest that section five zero two f confers this authority. I think that's wrong for numerous reasons.
01:09:02
Five zero two f is not a grant of substantive authority at all. Five zero two f is overwhelming wealth of evidence confirms was designed by Congress as a statute to authorize the payment of federal pay and benefits to state troops performing functions requested by federal government.
01:09:22
And that's Does
01:09:22
it allow paying of the privates that you... Under the provision you mentioned of DC code five one twenty nine point o three, which doesn't actually mention national guards at all. It mentions special privates without pay from among the citizens as the folks who can do, what you refer to the, you know, staffing inaugurations and helping in COVID
01:09:50
and Yes. I think it would very likely be the case that if the federal government requests aid, for example, in, assisting with an inauguration and the mayor consents to appoint the officers of special police, that that would trigger the payments, of, with the right to pay them and give them federal benefits under section five zero two f. What the statute doesn't do is grant independent substantive authority, and that's true for two independently sufficient reasons. The first, as your honor's question suggested, judge Garcia, is that there's a regulation that defines the circumstances in which, troops can perform functions in title 32 status. Section five zero two f expressly says any duties performed under that section must be, quote, under regulations to be prescribed by the secretary of the army or the secretary of the air force.
01:10:36
National Guard Bureau, a creature of both entities, has prescribed the key regulation as National Guard Regulation 500 dash five. And that regulation says over and over again, any duties performed in title 32 status are governed by state law, are defined by state law, and must be authorized by state law.
01:10:55
Does it explicitly address the DC?
01:10:57
Yes. As explicitly as one can imagine. On page romanette one, it says that, this regulation applies
01:11:07
What are you reading from?
01:11:08
I'm I'm reading out from National Guard regulation 500 dash five, the very first page, romanette one. It says, this regulation applies to the 50 states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District Of Columbia, and other territories, hereafter referred to as the several states. And then the definition section of this regulation on page 54 says, several states is defined as the 50 states, several territories, and the District Of Columbia. So I think my, friend's suggestion is just demonstrably wrong. Their brief had another response to this regulation, which I understood to be, they don't think this regulation expressly addresses title 32 deployments requested by the president under her section five zero two f two a.
01:11:48
That too is, demonstrably false. In section four dash one of this regulation, it says that title 32 deployments include deployments under five zero two f two a. So we have a regulation that says any deployments under five zero two f must accord, must be authorized by state law, including the law of the district. That regulation resolves the... The the...
01:12:09
Resolves the applicability of five zero two f two a if this court concludes the DC code does not authorize the deployment. There's a separate......
01:12:17
Some questions about the harms the district is claiming. Sure. The first one is you disclaim in your brief any sovereignty based injury. And I just wanna see if I share your understanding of what that means in concrete terms. Imagine someone just says, of course, there's a harm.
01:12:36
It's the District Of Columbia. There's armed guard members on the streets, and the district objects without any downstream consequence, that symbolic dignitary harm. Is that the type of harm you agree the district cannot rely upon because it is not a sovereign?
01:12:55
No, your honor. Our argument is that the district does not have any inherent constitutional sovereignty. It's not like a state in that respect. However, Congress has delegated it, but it's sometimes referred to as sovereignty, although I think that word has created some confusion. It has delegated it, the vast bulk of powers to govern the district, in...
01:13:13
As to local matters. Those those powers include the power to preserve the peace, protect public safety, oversee the police force, prevent crime. It's expressly spelled out in statute. And
01:13:25
The defendant's answer to that is that's great, but it's not exclusive as evidenced by the park police being Yep. Exclusively authorized to do. So why is this any different than if they double set the size of the park police, something the district has no control over?
01:13:39
Yes, your honor. So I think that Judge Rogers, you pointed out the question of the district's control over public safety and the police was a central question in in debates over the... Over home rule. This was, this was a matter of heavy contestation. Congress considered on the floor an amendment that would have given the president's control over the Metropolitan Police Department and voted down that amendment.
01:14:01
And instead, it granted the president a series of narrow... Narrowly tailored authorities to prevent crime and to protect federal interests in the district. Those are specific pockets of authority that enable him to do specific things. One is the authority, which was invoked on the very same day the National Guard was deployed to demand the services of the Metropolitan Police Departments in emergencies for up to thirty days. Another, as your honor, suggests, was his...
01:14:26
He retains his authority over the park police, a body which incidentally is not a roving police force in the district. It's a body who's assigned function by statute is to protect federal property and federal reservations in the district. And then there's, of course, his authority over the National Guard, which can be invoked, in various exigencies. Our argument is that when the president dramatically oversteps those limited grants of authority and assumes the authority to deploy a military force that right now is almost as large as the Metropolitan Police Department. This summer was several thousand troops larger to engage in ordinary law enforcement in the district, patrolling neighborhoods, detaining, detaining individuals, incidentally, while wearing military fatigues, carrying guns, and carrying handcuffs.
01:15:12
That is an intrusion on the, on the district's authority. It's to to, oversee crime fighting and protect public safety in the district. I think if it was a, that he was lawfully using a grant of authority in the statute such as over the park police, I don't think we'd have any arguments. He's overstepped the powers granted him. But when he dramatically oversteps and intrudes in an area that the district was entrusted with controlling, that is an intrusion of our statutory powers, and that's the very, harm the district court relied on.
01:15:44
But our harms don't end there. We've identified a series of concrete harms, which in a sense, I don't take defendants to seriously dispute. On the very first page of their brief. They say this deployment requires... As part of this deployment, the district coordinates...
01:16:00
Has to coordinate with the, DC National Guard.
01:16:04
More expenses, it seems to me, likely suffice to show standing. It's a different question whether those expenses suffice to show irreparable harm necessary to get a preliminary injunction. And I'd love to hear how you'd encourage us to think about that because we do have cases saying unrecoverable monetary losses can support irreparable harm, but they have to be very significant. So millions and millions of dollars, for example. And it doesn't seem in the record, at least at this stage, that there's a quantification of either these expenses, any lost tax revenue, the records just undeveloped.
01:16:43
So how would you respond to that?
01:16:44
Yes. So I wanna answer that, and then I wanna also address what what I think this court should do if you disagree. Those costs, have continued for several years. The requirements to coordinate on a daily basis with the DC National Guard, the requirement to ensure that they are conducting their operations in a way that does not harm public safety. We do have multiple declarations on the record.
01:17:05
Record. A declaration from general Buchanan, former military commander, a declaration from, chief Hall, former police chief that talk about the extremes public safety risks a jurisdiction would face if it did not coordinate extensively with military force, including the National Guard, deploying its jurisdiction. These are essential expenses that are necessary to prevent severe harms to public... Severe risks to public safety, and they are expenses that are ongoing to this very day. I think, unfortunately, the record in this case closed in November, but I think it's, a matter of common sense.
01:17:39
Those expenses have continued, and I think it's judicially noticeable that they have, in fact, continued just two weeks ago. The... There was widespread reporting the National Guard was staging troops near a public school. There were extensive complaints by residents concerned about going about their daily lives, concerned about fear to their children from the National Guard. The mayor's office put out a statement objecting to the deployment.
01:18:01
That's one of many such examples. Issues where the National Guard is posting troops near ballot drop boxes. Issues where the National Guard is sending troops to residential neighborhoods far from any federal property or interests, and and dramatically altering life in the district. And I think that is a harm because it requires the district to coordinate with the guard, address residents' complaints about their public safety, and it makes it harder for the National Guard to do its job as I think our declarations, the Buchanan and Hall declarations indicate because when people lose public trust
01:18:34
Harder for the National Guard to do its job or hard Excuse me. See police Yes.
01:18:38
I'm I'm I'm misspoke here. Harder for the police to do its job because as the... As our declarance explained, and as multiple Mika's briefs point out, when residents, lose public trust in any entity performing, law enforcement in a district, they cooperate less with the police. There's more fear and and mistrust, and and and that is... Makes a part of the police to do their jobs and is a threat to public safety.
01:19:03
I think there's evidence in the record of all of that. I... I'd also know we have a declaration, the Schwab declaration that points out that this has... The deployment has made certain residents fearful of going about their daily lives, going to going to work, especially vulnerable residents, and that has resulted in diminution in economic activity, and therefore, tax tax revenue.
01:19:23
And the position on all these economic harms is that it's not recoverable because of the federal government's cyber immunity?
01:19:31
Yes. Absolutely. And the Supreme Court has found, injuries to a, municipality's tax revenue as a basis for article three standing in the past. The Bank of America case in 2019, expressly found that, as does, as the... As did other cases excited in that opinion.
01:19:48
But I know that
01:19:49
isn't the problem with that argument in part that the district's always had to coordinate a lot with a lot of different federal entities. That's the nature of the District Of Columbia. There are 49 heads of agencies and operations that you have to coordinate with to do anything. So, now there's another, you know, entity at the table as it were. So trying to go that way.
01:20:20
So your strongest argument, I thought, but, you know, just thinking about this case is intrusion with the legislative concept developed by Congress in the Home Rule Act. And the pushback to that is, well... But as to the National Guard, the DC National Guard, Congress gave the new home rule government no authority greater than what it had had before. And so we have all these OLC opinions saying, oh, no. There's authority to do this, authority to do that, authority to do the other.
01:21:04
Other things, the mayor has wanted. So there hasn't been this clash. Alright? And what I was trying to get at, and you don't argue this, but it's almost, to me, a separation of powers issue. Who's in charge here?
01:21:19
Congress or the president? And when the president asks for money to help the city improve its law enforcement, congress gives the money. Congress anticipates the mayor will get that money, and the mayor says it hasn't been released to me. That's the problem. Alright?
01:21:43
That's a different type of harm that you don't argue, and it isn't argued. So, you know, it's not before the court. But when you say intrusion in law enforcement authority, I mean, there's so many different entities that intrude in DC law enforcement authority, whether it's police forces, whether it's the board of trade, whether it's other entities, labor unions, etcetera. All this has to be coordinated. That's what the mayor's job in DC is.
01:22:14
Now the difference is military. Yes. I thought your strongest argument was a historical one. And when Congress comes along, notwithstanding that historical argument, and says, well, you get this limited home rule authority, but not over the DC National Guard. Things stay as they were.
01:22:40
So as they were, says The United States is, you know, there are all these statutes out here, and we don't read them as narrowly as you would like us to read them. And maybe you're right. But at least the office of legal counsel has gone along repeatedly looking at these authorizations as very broad. Alright? That's where it's hard to see that mere cost of communicating and coordinating is irreparable harm.
01:23:16
That's part of life in DC.
01:23:18
Yes, your honor.
01:23:19
As distinct somewhat from a state, alright, where you don't have all these federal and compact and congressional requirements that have to be checked.
01:23:37
A few So
01:23:40
were you to consider that, what's your strongest comeback?
01:23:45
A a few responses, judge judges. I agree that a very strong basis for standing in harm in this case is the intrusion on our legislative authority. And I think that intrusion is grounded in both the historical compromise about what authorities would be vested in the district and what within... What limited authorities would be vested in the president. And I think a course of dealing over decades since then that I think could reasonably include congress's appropriations decisions that law enforcement should be conducted by the district in the main with narrow exceptions.
01:24:18
I think that as to the additional coordination costs, which I don't think are necessary for us to establish either standing or harm, But to the extent you're looking for additional concrete injuries, I think the record makes clear there are additional costs that are different in in magnitude and kinds than the ordinary coordination cost the district has with the federal government. This is a several thousand member, a large military force conducting widespread crime deterrents and crime fighting activities in the district. We have seen nothing like this in the district's history. This requires extensive coordination on a daily basis that, as I mentioned, include, extends to the present day, ensuring that that force is not used in a way that undermines the district's own law enforcement activities. And, and and I think and I think that between those various harms, that's sufficient to establish our injury.
01:25:12
But even if you disagree with all of that and you think there's a question as to ability to establish reparable harm in this case, this case is teed up for summary judgment in the district court. The parties have agreed. There's no need for further factual development, and the district court is poised to resolve the case of summary judgment after this court rules. If the court thinks we win on the merits but has questions about irreparable harm, it can easily send the case back to district court where its decision on the merits will be conclusive as to summary judgment, and would take the issues of the equities and irreparable harm off the table. I, of course, don't think the court should do that.
01:25:43
I think we've... This report was right that we have a irreparable injury here, but I also think, I think it's critical that this court address the merits and make clear to the make clear to the district court, this deployment is unlawful, so it can enter final judgment in our favor. I just wanted to briefly return, if I may, to the, DC code provisions. I heard my opponent make a key concession at the podium that he does not believe sections 49 dash four zero four and four zero five of the code are a font of authority for the DC Guard. He has therefore rejected the premise of the state panel's decision in this case.
01:26:18
Those were the provisions the state panel rested its, its judgment on that it thought those were a font of authority for the DC Guard. I think that concession is correct for at least two reasons. One is those provisions don't apply to the DC Guard at all. They apply to the enrolled militia, which is a distinct body as numerous provisions of the code make clear. And, indeed, as the federal, code provision they cite, 10 USC two four six makes clear, it says that every state militia has to be divided into two classes, the organized militia, which is the national guard, and the unorganized militia, which is everyone else.
01:26:53
So these are two, separate bodies. And in addition, those provisions are not framed as grants of authority. They are framed as limits on the president's authority to deploy the enrolled militia. So he has identified... The government has just identified no provision in the DC code that would confer the unusual and extraordinary power to deploy the National Guard in any circumstance the president wishes or to perform any civilian function he wishes.
01:27:18
And I think for that reason, we prevail on... Under the DC code. Section five zero two f confers no additional authority. And because the DC Guard deployment is unlawful, the state deployments, which are premised on the DC Guard deployment, must be enjoined as well.
01:27:32
But it could be rendered lawful if the president requested that the mayor or the the... One of the two federal officials sought involvement by the DCND?
01:27:46
I don't think this deployment could be rendered lawful. I think some deployments would be lawful. 49 Dash 103 has a set of substantive criteria that need to be satisfied as well as the procedural criterion. Your honor just referenced, it needs to be a riot, mob, tumult, or other breach of the peace. I I do think to your honest question that would easily include an insurrection or invasion by a foreign army.
01:28:07
But, in addition to the federal law provisions that authorize deployment to the DC Guard in that circumstance. But as to this deployment, there's no contention and defendants have made none that what is occurring in the district right now is a mob riot tumult or similar disturbance. And even if there was such a disturbance for some limited period of time, this deployment is not, quote, is not limited to, quote, suppressing the same, which is the limit on the president's authority latter half of that provision. So he could only deploy the guard if he had a request from one of his subordinates, which he could direct them to make. If there were...
01:28:41
One was one of those events and the deployment was limited to suppressing one of those events. Thank you, your honor.
01:28:59
I just have two main points that I wanna make about the DC militia code. One, historical and one textual. Starting out with the history, remains the case that the district has not identified militia that would function similar to a state national to create a militia that would function similar to a state national guard. It's also inconsistent with what congress said in the very committee report they cite in 1889 when they said they were creating the DC national guard so that it could be in any and every crisis, the first defenders of the capital. My friend on the other side said that in 1889, state national guards were much more limited bodies.
01:29:51
I've read their statutory addendum carefully. That was not the lesson I took away from it. At addendum 65 to 75, there's a whole slew of states that were authorized. The government... Where the governor was authorized to call out the guard to aid the civil authorities in executing the laws, the same exact authority that we're saying the president was granted under the DC militia code.
01:30:10
Even apart from that, some other concrete examples, New Jersey, addendum 59 in the case of invasion or other emergency. Connecticut, addendum 53 for the defense or relief of the state. Delaware, addendum 53 for public defense against domestic violence. Kentucky addendum 58, whenever any invasion domestic violence or other great public danger makes it necessary for the enforcement of the law, the preservation of peace, and the security of rights, lives, or property. State national guards often had very broad authority to do all the kinds of things that the DC national guards has has historically done that under their interpretation, the DC guard could not do.
01:30:51
The only answer I heard to that was the invocation of this provision, five... DC code section five one twenty nine point o three, which we address on page 22 of our reply brief. That is not any kind of authority to deploy the National Guard.
01:31:04
Another answer was twelve four zero six, which in cases of rebellion or insurrection... Invasion would allow the president to call out the DC Guard. Right? Right.
01:31:12
And as I mentioned before, I don't think it's a plausible account of congress's intent in creating this quasi state militia to say that the president would have to federalize the militia in order to use them in a way a state could traditionally use a state militia. So that's on the on the historical side. Textually, my friend on the other side said that we have no textual basis for the idea that the president under under the DC militia code can deploy the guard in aid of the civil authorities. So I just wanna be very clear about what we think the textual basis is, and we are relying on the same, provisions that state panel relied on. I disagree with my friend on the other side's characterization of what the state panel relied on.
01:31:55
I think first, it's the commander in chief designation, but that's... Doesn't stand alone. It's also a whole set of separate provisions. I count at least four that clearly contemplate that the guard can be deployed to aid the civil authorities. That's one zero four, four zero four, nine zero one, and nine zero four.
01:32:13
But I wanna back up first and address the commander in chief provision by itself.
01:32:17
One zero four four zero four nine zero one.
01:32:20
Nine zero four. I'll come to those in a moment, but I I first wanna address the commander in chief designation. I think the district is wrong that a commander in chief designation never carries it with it any authority to deploy the card. Just think about for example, the constitution designating the president as the commander in chief of the federal armed forces. I don't think anyone thinks that further statutory authorization is needed in order for the president to deploy the federal armed forces, for example, to repel an invasion or to put down a domestic rebellion.
01:32:51
That term, standing alone does carry authority to deploy the guard unless the legislature has otherwise limited it. And I encourage you to look at the cases they've cited. I've read them all. Not a single one stands for the proposition that a commander in chief designation never confers any substantive authority to deploy the guard. But we're not relying on that alone.
01:33:09
I think the key thing here is you have that designation and and you also have this separate set of provisions that assume that authority exists. They're not fonts of authority but they're written in a way that they assume that authority exists. Their only answer to this is to say that all of those provisions are simply referring back to one zero three, the riot suppression provision. But that is incorrect and that is most clear from section four zero four and section nine zero one both of which refer in the disjunctive to riot suppression
01:33:39
referred to one zero four. Is that the one you meant?
01:33:44
One zero four is one of the four. The two I'm focused on now are four zero four and nine zero one.
01:33:49
Yeah. But I'm just trying to understand whether... But you meant one zero three or what... One zero two. You meant one zero four.
01:33:57
There are four provisions that talk about aiding the civil authorities. One zero four, four zero four, nine zero one, nine zero four. Their only answer is to say that's just all referring back to one zero three, suppressing riots. That's all aid to civil authorities means is suppressing riots at the request of an official under one zero three. I think the key textual response to that is four zero four and nine zero one both refer in the disjunctive to suppressing riots and aiding the civil authorities on on their reading of the code that
01:34:30
I might point out that one zero three says that if the predicates are satisfied, you can call out the guard to, aid the civil authorities in suppressing such violence and enforcing the laws. So Right. The... Each of these callbacks could just be read as a reference to those two items in one zero three.
01:34:49
Yeah. I don't think that's a plausible reading of four zero four and nine zero one. One zero three isn't a general general delegation to aid the civil authorities. It all has to occur occur in the context of a riot or other tumult. Only then can you activate the guard to assist with enforcing the law as part of suppressing that riot or tumult.
01:35:07
I think if you look at four zero four and nine zero one, it's pretty clear they contemplate a general authority to aid the civil authorities in executing the laws. So nine zero one is a pay provision, but it provides a rates of pay when the decent national guard, quote, is ordered to duty in case of riot, tumult breach of the peace or whenever called in aid of the civil authorities. That first part of it, riot, tumult, breach of the peace, that's clearly a reference to one zero three. And then we have this other general reference or when ordered on duty to aid the civil authorities.
01:35:41
And your basic point is that all these provisions envision some implicit or stemming from the commander in chief provision, just a general deployment authority to aid civil authorities. Right. That's how you would
01:35:50
They they assume that authority exists, and I think that greatly buttresses our understanding of the commander in chief clause. And if you're not persuaded by the commander in chief clause argument, we also have the the fallback argument under section one zero two.
01:36:01
I understand all of these able arguments about DC law. Assume just for the moment that we were to disagree with them. DC says, if the DC Guard deployment is not authorized because of the way the MOUs are structured, among other things, it might be harder to say who's in charge, but it does say the DC Guard gives operational direction. And they say, if the DC Guard is not lawfully deployed, this just can't function. So that alone is enough to enjoin the State Guard deployments.
01:36:36
What's your response to that argument?
01:36:38
Yeah. We disagree with that. I mean, it would it would then be up to the president and the state governors, I suppose, to restructure the mission and to come up with new memorandum... Memoranda of understanding about how
01:36:49
to function. This this deployment should be enjoined in the the what you just said is exactly what you have. Right?
01:36:57
In joining these particular memoranda of understanding? I mean, I I think even even if the DC Guard isn't authorized to deploy, I think we still have separate arguments that it's proper to invite the state guards to assist with the federal mission to protect federal personnel and property in the district. So I I I think there is authority for that, and that's a separate question from whether these memoranda of understanding would remain effective.
01:37:28
Alright. Thank you. Thank you, your honors.